Permission to Link: Making Available via Hyperlinks in the European Union after Svensson by Burri, Mira
Permission to Link
2014 245 3
Permission to Link
Making Available via Hyperlinks in the European Union after 
Svensson
Mira Burri, World Trade Institute, University of Bern.
© 2014 Mirra Burri
Everybody may disseminate this article by electronic means and make it available for download under the terms and 
conditions of the Digital Peer Publishing Licence (DPPL). A copy of the license text may be obtained at http://nbn-resolving.
de/urn:nbn:de:0009-dppl-v3-en8.
Keywords:  Svensson,  WCT, WPPT, CJEU, Making Available
A. Introduction
1 Digital technologies, online communications and 
electronic commerce have destabilized the global 
copyright system. The 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties – 
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty (WCT)1 and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)2 – were an early response 
to this sea change, which subsequently triggered 
a wave of even further-reaching implementation 
actions, both nationally and in other venues.
2 The state of the political economy and geopolitical 
compromises during the negotiation of the WIPO 
Internet Treaties, however, made the agreements 
that were adopted fairly agnostic about certain 
details and deferred some of the hard questions 
to member states’ law-makers who were tasked 
with implementing the treaties.3 While the desire 
for certainty in international intellectual property 
(IP) law is understandable, especially for rights 
holders, leaving the resolution of complex or 
controversial questions to domestic law-makers 
and allowing the tailoring of law to economic 
conditions, technological developments and local 
priorities may ultimately be preferable to locking 
in premature or possibly ill-conceived international 
IP norms. Some eighteen years after the WIPO 
Internet Treaties were signed, this article looks more 
carefully at their implementation and interpretation 
in the EU. It examines one particular, and arguably 
less thematized, subset of rights and looks at the 
European law and practice of “making available” as 
a mode of communication to the public. The specific 
focus is on the recent case of Svensson v. Retriever AB,4 
brought before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) as a preliminary ruling with regard to 
making available via hyperlinking, which clarified 
some of the critical issues in this context.
3 There is no doubt that international law forms 
an important part of the context in which courts 
interpret and apply national legislation. In this sense, 
before turning to the specific case study, a look at the 
origins and contents of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ 
provisions is essential – first, so as to understand 
their basic structure and flexibility, and second, to 
contextualize the evolution of the copyright regime 
and its incessant, albeit not necessarily successful, 
struggle to cope with the digital challenge. 
B. The Origins of “Making Available” 
in the WIPO Internet Treaties
4 The 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties were adopted as 
“special agreements” under the Berne Convention 
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on Artistic and Literary Works5 and sought to 
modernize global copyright law and make it fit for 
the Internet age by providing “adequate solutions to 
questions raised by new economic, social, cultural 
and technological developments”.6 Admittedly, 
the goal was fairly ambitious, especially as, at the 
time of the treaties’ adoption, the dynamics of the 
digital networked space were largely unknown 
and there was little or no understanding of the 
fundamental and often disruptive ways in which 
digital technologies would change the conventional 
modes of creating, distributing, accessing, using 
and re-using cultural content and knowledge.7 
The constituencies behind the treaties’ adoption, 
overrepresented by the entertainment industries,8 
were largely preoccupied with other implications 
of digital media, such as the ability to make perfect 
copies, or to distribute and consume copyrighted 
content without the limitations of distance and 
space.9
5 In sync with this inherent utilitarianism and 
despite the rhetoric of “the need to maintain a 
balance between the rights of authors and the 
larger public interest, particularly education, 
research and access to information”,10 the WIPO 
“treaties were intentionally far less concerned 
with enabling new modes of creative enterprise 
than preserving the existing presumptions in favor 
of authorial prerogative”.11 Overall, and with the 
benefit of hindsight, it appears that, “[g]iven the 
unrestrained versatility of innovation in the digital 
arena, the WIPO Internet Treaties have fallen 
considerably short in what was to be their central 
mission: namely, to provide a relevant and credible 
source of norms to facilitate knowledge creation in 
the global digital context”.12 It is also evident that 
the impact of the WIPO Internet Treaties has long 
been overshadowed by national implementation 
initiatives and the emergence of further-reaching 
implementation models, notably that of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)13 in the United States 
and the Information Society Directive14 in the European 
Union (EU). Such models have also been replicated 
in subsequent preferential trade agreements in 
bilateral and regional fora, in particular where 
industrialized countries are partners to the deal.15
6 Scholarly literature offers extensive coverage of the 
WIPO Internet Treaties, their implementation and 
overall effect on the conditions for creativity in the 
digital networked environment, paying particular 
attention to the introduction of technological 
protection measures (TPMs) and the ban on 
circumventing such measures, which may, in effect, 
have limited the scope of fair use in digital media.16 
One change, however, has received comparatively 
less academic attention – that is, the expansion of 
copyright to cover merely “making available”, as 
opposed to copying or transmitting works and other 
subject matter.
7 This piece looks at this subset of rights as they may 
have crucial implications for creativity online and 
for the sustainability of the digital space itself.17 We 
deem it also important, especially considering the 
fuzziness of some of the WIPO Internet Treaties’ 
norms, to conduct not only textual and conceptual 
analyses of these provisions but also a jurisprudential 
analysis that considers the treaties’ practical impact 
on the outcome of litigated cases. We hope in this 
manner to complement the existing literature.18
8 Making available is mentioned in two separate 
articles of the WCT – Articles 6 and 8.
Article 6
Right of Distribution
(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the 
public of the original and copies of their works through sale 
or other transfer of ownership.
Article 8
Right of Communication to the Public
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 
11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the 
Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall 
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication 
to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, 
including the making available to the public of their works 
in such a way that members of the public may access these 
works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
9 The agreed statements accompanying Article 6 
clarify that it applies, at a minimum, to copies that 
can be circulated as tangible objects. However, 
nothing prevents countries from applying the 
right of distribution also to intangible copies, as an 
additional and/or alternative means of providing 
authors the exclusive right to authorize the making 
available of their works.19 The WPPT provides for 
similar protection of performers and record makers 
in Articles 10 and 14, respectively – under different 
headings, “Right of Making Available of Fixed 
Performances” and “Right of Making Available of 
Phonograms”.
10 A key point about these provisions is that the 
particular headings under which the treaties 
refer to making available are not that important. 
Indeed, the WIPO Internet Treaties provide for 
a flexible approach to making available – the so-
called “umbrella solution” – which permits different 
domestic implementations through various new 
or existing rights or combinations of rights. “It is 
important that treaty member states protect making 
available, not how specifically they do so”.20 
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11 This constructive ambiguity facilitated an agreement 
between jurisdictions with different conceptions of 
the bundle of rights that constitute copyright, and 
could allow countries implementing the umbrella 
solution to choose to characterize making available 
as an authorization, communication, distribution, 
reproduction, or sui generis activity, or some 
combination of those possibilities.21
12 The following section looks at the case law of the 
CJEU on the qualification of communication to the 
public in general, and then pays particular attention 
to the long-awaited judgment in the Case C-466/12, 
Nils Svensson and others v. Retriever AB. This allows us 
to put the entire development of the EU case law 
on the topic into perspective, and to sketch out the 
potentially far-reaching repercussions for digital 
copyright law. 
C. “Making Available” in 
EU Copyright Law
13 The European Union has implemented the making 
available provisions of the WIPO Internet Treaties 
through the Information Society Directive. The relevant 
Article 3 thereof reads as follows:
Article 3
Right of communication to the public of works 
and right of making available to the public other 
subject-matter
1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive 
right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the 
public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including 
the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access them from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them.
2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to 
authorise or prohibit the making available to the public, 
by wire or wireless means, in such a way that members 
of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them:
(a) for performers, of fixations of their performances;
(b) for phonogram producers, of their phonograms;
(c) for the producers of the first fixations of films, of the 
original and copies of their films;
(d) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their 
broadcasts, whether these broadcasts are transmitted by 
wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite.
14 Upon this basis, the CJEU has over the years 
sought to delineate the boundaries of the right of 
communication to the public and to establish a 
coherent interpretation across the Member States’ 
jurisdictions. Interestingly, prior to Svensson, it had 
not encountered a case that dealt directly with the 
question of whether hyperlinking constitutes a 
communication to the public in the sense of Article 3 
of the Information Society Directive; a number of other 
cases have nonetheless dealt with communication to 
the public through other technological means. In the 
following section, we summarize the court’s practice 
and, in this sense, also explain the jurisprudential 
context of Svensson.
I. Relevant case law 
prior to Svensson 
15 It is admittedly hard to write a clear summary of 
the CJEU’s practice on communication to the public, 
as there have been some disparities and issues that 
have yet to be clarified, especially as different cases 
refer to different technological platforms. An early 
seminal case in the jurisprudence is Case C-306/05, 
Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) 
v Rafael Hoteles SA22 that concerned a hotel that 
made broadcasting signals available over the hotel’s 
closed network. There, the CJEU adopted a broad 
interpretation of “communication to the public” 
under the Information Society Directive. It argued 
that “while the mere provision of physical facilities 
does not as such amount to communication […], 
the distribution of a signal by means of television 
sets by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, 
whatever technique is used to transmit the signal, 
constitutes communication to the public within the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of that directive”.23 Further, 
the Court pointed out that the “private nature of 
hotel rooms does not preclude the communication of 
a work by means of television sets from constituting 
communication to the public within the meaning of 
Article 3(1)”.24 In a more recent case, SCF Consorzio 
Fonografici, however, the CJEU maintained that 
the free-of-charge broadcasting of phonograms 
in private dental practices does not fall under the 
definition of “communication to the public”, as 
the number of persons was small, the music played 
was not part of the dental practice, the patients 
“enjoyed” the music without having made an active 
choice, and in any case patients were not receptive 
to the music under the dental practice’s conditions.25 
Equally important, the CJEU found in the case of BSA 
that the television broadcasting of a graphical user 
interface (GUI)26 does not constitute communication 
to the public because the viewers are passive and do 
not have the possibility of intervening.27 
16 Overall, despite some fuzziness in the case law, it 
appears that several elements must be present 
to establish a “communication to the public” in 
accordance with Article 3(1) of the Information 
Society Directive, which is, as we saw earlier, an almost 
verbatim implementation of Article 8 of the WCT.28 
First, there must be a “transmission” of a protected 
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work, although this transmission can happen 
irrespective of the technical means.29 This has 
been made clear by the Information Society Directive 
itself, which explicitly states in the preamble that 
the, “… right [of communication to the public] 
should be understood in a broad sense covering all 
communication to the public not present at the place 
where the communication originates. This right 
should cover any such transmission or retransmission 
of a work to the public by wire or wireless means, 
including broadcasting. This right should not cover 
any other acts”.30 
17 Second, the communication must be an additional 
service that is not caught merely by coincidence 
by the users, and also aims at making some profit. 
Later case law has clarified, however, that “a profit-
making nature does not determine conclusively 
whether a retransmission [...] is to be categorised 
as a ‘communication’ within the meaning of Article 
3(1) of Directive 2001/29”, nor is the competitive 
relationship between the organizations.31 
18 Third, it appears that the courts require a “fairly 
large number”32 of potential listeners or viewers. 
The Court has recently also clarified that a one-to-
one service, such as streaming, qualifies, too, as it 
does not prevent a large number of persons of having 
access to the same work at the same time.33
19 There also has to be a so-called “new public”. In SGAE, 
the Court referred to Article 11bis (1)(ii) of the Berne 
Convention and noted that the transmission is to be 
“made to a public different from the public at which 
the original act of communication of the work is 
directed, that is, to a new public”.34 The Court further 
specified in the case of Football Association Premier 
League that this is a public “which was not taken into 
account by the authors of the protected works when 
they authorised their use by the communication to 
the original public”.35 It may well be that the original 
public is, in fact, broader than the new one (but it 
would not have had access without an intervention). 
This assertion has been maintained by a series of 
cases.36
20 In Airfield – a case concerning satellite package 
providers – the Court stressed that “[s]uch activity 
[…] constitutes an intervention without which those 
subscribers would not be able to enjoy the work’s 
broadcast, although physically within that area. 
Thus, those persons form part of the public targeted 
by the satellite package provider itself, which, 
by its intervention in the course of the satellite 
communication in question, makes the protected 
works accessible to a public which is additional to 
the public targeted by the broadcasting organisation 
concerned”.37
21 This last criterion, however, seems to depend on the 
facts of the case, as the most recent CJEU judgment 
in ITV Broadcasting Ltd & 6 Ors v TV Catchup38 shows. In 
this case, the CJEU stated that it was not necessary to 
examine the requirement for a “new” public. While 
the Court justified such an examination in older 
cases, such as SGAE, Football Association and Airfield, it 
found the analysis irrelevant to the case at hand. The 
CJEU stated that, “In those cases, the Court examined 
situations in which an operator had made accessible, 
by its deliberate intervention, a broadcast containing 
protected works to a new public which was not 
considered by the authors concerned when they 
authorised the broadcast in question”.39 The present 
case, however, concerned the transmission of works 
included in a terrestrial broadcast and the making 
available of those works over the Internet. The CJEU 
found that “each of those two transmissions must 
be authorised individually and separately by the 
authors concerned given that each is made under 
specific technical conditions, using a different means 
of transmission for the protected works, and each 
is intended for a public”.40 TV Catchup was a swift 
and confident judgment by the CJEU confirming the 
rights of broadcasters and clearly classifying online 
streaming as a restricted copyright category, which 
requires the right holders’ authorization.41
II. Anticipating Svensson
22 Despite the evolution of the EU case law with regard 
to the scope of communication to the public, there 
was no clear-cut template applicable to all situations. 
It was, for instance, unclear how the different 
criteria that the CJEU has come up with related 
to each other,42 and, even more critically for our 
discussion, how the test applies to hyperlinking, 
and whether hyperlinking qualifies as the copyright-
relevant act of communication to the public. 
The academic discourse pending the decision of 
Svensson has been intense and often controversial. 
The European Copyright Society (ECS), which 
brings together renowned scholars to discuss and 
critically evaluate developments in EU copyright 
in an effort to promote the public interest, took 
the opportunity offered by Svensson to advise the 
Court on its legal classification of hyperlinking.43 In 
particular, it suggested, based on the existing case 
law (but before TV Catchup), that hyperlinking should 
not be qualified as a communication to the public 
because (i) there is no transmission involved; (ii) 
even if transmission is not necessary for there to 
be a “communication”, the rights of the copyright 
owner apply only to communication “of the work”, 
and whatever a hyperlink provides, it is not “of a 
work”; and (iii) the “new public” requirement is not 
fulfilled.
23 This position has been endorsed by a large body of 
scholarly literature – based, on the one hand, on 
interpretation of the law and, on the other hand, 
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on considerations of the vital role of hyperlinks in 
the architecture and the functioning of the web.44 
Developments in other jurisdictions were also 
largely supportive of such a standing – for instance, 
the US jurisprudence provides a clear precedent with 
regard to Internet links,45 and recent developments 
in Canada go in a similar direction.46 
24 The International Literary and Artistic Association 
(L’Association Littéraire es Artistique Internationale 
– ALAI) also adopted an opinion on hyperlinking 
and how it affects the right of communication to 
the public.47  The ALAI, however, made a different 
case. It argued that what really matters in finding 
a communication to the public is that, “(i) the act 
of an individual person, directly or indirectly, (ii) 
has the distinct effect of addressing the public, 
irrespective of the tool, instrument, or device that 
the individual has used to bring about that effect, 
and (iii) that elements protected by copyright or 
material protected by related rights thus become 
available to the public in a way that is encompassed 
by the discrete rights granted under copyright”.48 
The ALAI stresses the notion of the public and finds 
that links that lead directly to specific protected 
material, thereby using its unique URL, would fall 
within the framework of a copyright use. The ALAI 
deems this kind of linking to be a “making available” 
regardless of whether the link takes the user to 
specific content in a way that makes it clear to the 
user that he/she has been taken to a third-party 
website, or whether the linking site retains a frame 
around the content, so that the user is not aware that 
he/she is accessing the content from a third-party 
website. While this is a strong statement, the ALAI 
softens it somewhat by saying that a mere reference 
to a source where protected material can be accessed 
would not constitute a copyright-relevant act.49  The 
ALAI also acknowledges the burden so placed upon 
actors on the Internet using hyperlinking, and deems 
that legislative or court action may find a different 
assessment appropriate.50
25 Next to settling these scholarly disputes and 
providing some legal certainty at the EU level, the 
decision in Svensson also appeared to be crucial with 
regard to addressing some divergences in Member 
States’ case law on hyperlinking and liability under 
copyright law. It is important to stress here that 
Article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive fully 
harmonizes “communication to the public” as one 
of the palette of economic rights of the copyright 
holder,51 and thus also of how Article 8 WCT is to be 
implemented and interpreted throughout the EU. 
In contrast, while creating hyperlinks could trigger 
different types of liability, such as: (i) accessory 
liability, in particular with respect to knowingly 
facilitating the making of illegal copies;52 (ii) unfair 
competition; (iii) moral rights’ infringement; or 
(iv) liability for circumvention of technological 
protection measures, only the latter has been subject 
to harmonization at the European level, and thus 
falls within the CJEU’s competence.53
26 Three national court judgments appear important in 
the context of the present discussion. Two of them 
have not classified hyperlinking as a communication 
to the public. In Germany, the highest federal court 
(Bundesgerichtshof) found that the “paperboy search 
engine”, which searched newspaper websites and 
provided search results including hyperlinks to the 
original sources, did not constitute communication 
in the sense of German law and the Information 
Society Directive, and did not infringe copyright.54 
In the case of Napster.no,55 the Supreme Court of 
Norway held that posting hyperlinks, which led to 
unlawful uploading of MP3 files, did not constitute 
an act of making the files available to the public. 
The Court dismissed the argument that the linking 
involved an independent and immediate access 
to the music. Additionally, it stressed that, “[i]t 
cannot be doubted that simply making a website 
address known by rendering it on the internet is not 
making a work publicly available. This must be the 
case independent of whether the address concerns 
lawfully or unlawfully posted material”.56 The case 
was decided on the basis of secondary liability, which 
is not harmonized at the EU level, and referred to 
unlawful content of the target website, as well as to 
the knowledge of the person posting the particular 
link.57
27 These rulings, however, contrast with the Dutch 
decision in Sanoma and Playboy v GS Media.58 There, the 
Dutch District Court vaguely referred to the existing 
EU case law on communication to the public and 
found that a company is liable for a communication 
to the public when that company puts a hyperlink 
on its website.59 The Court found all three elements 
of the test (which it had itself extracted somewhat 
frivolously from the CJEU’s jurisprudence) – that is, 
an intervention, a (new) public, and the intention 
to make a profit – present. With regard to the first 
element, the Court stated that, “the placing of a 
hyperlink which refers to a location on the internet 
where a specific work is made available to the public 
is, in principle, not an independent act of publication. 
The factual making available to the public occurs 
on the website to which the hyperlink refers.” Yet, 
in that specific case, the website containing the 
photographs was not indexed by search engines, and 
the Court believed that in order to be able to see the 
pictures, users would have to type in the specific 
URL, so that without the additional intervention of 
hyperlinking, the public would not have had access 
to the photographs. The Court supported its view 
with the fact that the defendant’s website attracted 
substantial traffic (some 230,000 visitors per day) 
and the hyperlink had ensured that the public 
knew about the photographs even before they were 
published in the claimant’s magazine, Playboy. The 
Court also found that the criterion of “new public” 
2014
Mira Burri
250 3
was fulfilled as initially only a very small audience 
had known about the series of photographs (not all 
of which had been published), and the placing of the 
hyperlink had enabled a large and indeterminate 
circle of people to find out about the series of 
photographs – a public other than the one the 
copyright holder had in mind when giving consent 
for the publication of the photo story.60
III. The Judgment in Svensson
28 Against this backdrop, one can understand why 
Svensson was so eagerly anticipated and hotly 
debated, and what its significance for EU and 
national copyright law, as well as more broadly for 
access and use of works on the Internet, might be. 
Case C-466/12, Svensson, was referred to the CJEU by 
the Swedish Court of Appeal for a preliminary ruling, 
and the Court issued its judgment on February 13, 
2014. In essence, it addressed one key question: 
whether putting a hyperlink on a website constitutes 
a “communication to the public” under the EU’s 
Information Society Directive.61
29 The claimants, Nils Svensson and a few other 
Swedish journalists, had written articles for a 
Swedish newspaper (Göteborgs-Posten) that published 
them in print, as well as made them available on 
the newspaper’s website. Retriever Sverige AB, the 
defendant in the case, offers a subscription-based 
service, whereby customers can access newspaper 
articles through the provision of a clickable link 
that directs clients to the third-party source – the 
original website where the requested content is 
freely accessible.62 Svensson sued Retriever for 
“equitable remuneration”, arguing that Retriever 
had made his article available through the search-
and-alert functions on its website. This, he 
maintained, falls within the copyright relevant 
acts of either communication to the public or the 
public performance of a work,  neither for which 
he had given consent. Retriever denied any liability 
to pay equitable remuneration. Retriever’s basic 
argument was that the linking mechanisms do not 
constitute copyright-relevant acts, and therefore no 
infringement of copyright law occurred. The Swedish 
District Court rejected the claimants’ application. 
The applicants in the main proceeding then brought 
an appeal against the judgment of the District Court 
before the Swedish Court of Appeal, which referred 
the case for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU asking 
for a clarification on the interpretation of Article 3 
of the Information Society Directive.
30 Fortunately, the CJEU was able to match the 
relatively simple facts of the case with a relatively 
straightforward decision. In a 42-paragraph-long 
judgment, and without an opinion of the Advocate 
General, the Court decided that “Article 3(1) of 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of May 22, 2001, on the harmonisation 
of certain aspects of copyright and related rights 
in the information society, must be interpreted as 
meaning that the provision on a website of clickable 
links to works freely available on another website 
does not constitute an ‘act of communication to the 
public’”.63
31 The Court did apply the test as developed in the 
case law, so far, and went through the different 
criteria of “act of communication” of a work and 
the communication of that work to a “public” that 
must be “new public”.64 Following on from SGAE,65 
the Court found that for there to be an “act of 
communication”, it is sufficient, in particular, that 
a work is made available to a public in such a way 
that the persons forming that public may access it, 
irrespective of whether they avail themselves of 
that opportunity.66 In this sense, the Court found 
that in the case before it, “the provision of clickable 
links to protected works must be considered to 
be ‘making available’ and, therefore, an ‘act of 
communication’”.67 It then went on to examine 
the criterion of “public” and while finding that 
the requirements of “an indeterminate number of 
potential recipients and […] a fairly large number of 
persons” were satisfied,68 it firmly stated that there 
needs to be a “new public,” too.
32 This new public that “was not taken into account 
by the copyright holders when they authorized the 
initial communication to the public”69 was, however, 
not given in Svensson. The public targeted by the 
initial communication consisted of all potential 
visitors to the site concerned, since, given that 
access to the works on that site was not subject to 
any restrictive measures, all Internet users could 
have free access to them.70
33 The court went on to clarify that this finding cannot 
be called into question, even when the work appears 
in such a way as to give the impression that it is 
appearing on the site on which that link is found, 
whereas, in fact, the work in question comes from 
another site,71 thereby addressing indirectly the so-
called “embedded” or “framed” links, as well.72
34 The case will be different, however, where a clickable 
link makes it possible for users of the site on which 
that link appears to circumvent restrictions put 
in place by the site on which the protected work 
appears in order to restrict public access to that 
work to the latter site’s subscribers only. Then, 
the link constitutes an intervention without which 
those users would not be able to access the works 
transmitted, and all of those users must be deemed 
a “new public”. The Court stated that the copyright 
holders’ authorization would be required for such 
a communication to the public.73 This is the case, 
in particular, where the work is no longer available 
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to the public on the site on which it was initially 
communicated or if it is henceforth available on that 
site only to a restricted public, while being accessible 
on another Internet site without the copyright 
holders’ authorization.
35 Finally, the court addressed the fourth question 
asked by the Swedish Court: namely, whether 
it is possible for a Member State to give wider 
protection to authors’ exclusive rights by enabling 
“communication to the public” to cover a greater 
range of acts than those provided for in Article 3(1). 
The Court ruled in the negative – EU Member States 
cannot deviate and extend the scope of protection 
for copyright holders further by broadening the 
concept of “communication to the public” to include 
a wider range of activities than those referred to 
in Article 3 of the Information Society Directive.74 The 
Court weighted, in particular, the perils of legislative 
differences and legal uncertainty that would 
have triggered, while leaving aside the broader 
but certainly underlying questions of balancing 
between private and public interests and allowing 
for creativity in the digital space.
D. Conclusion: Permission 
to Link and Some Open 
Questions after Svensson
36 The preliminary ruling of the CJEU in C-466/12, 
Svensson v Retriever AB, addressed the question of 
whether hyperlinking constitutes communication 
to the public and what sort of copyright liability it 
triggers. It clarified the scope of Article 3(1) of the 
Information Society Directive, which fully harmonizes 
“communication to the public,” thus also making 
clear how Article 8 WCT is to be implemented and 
interpreted throughout the EU. The judgment 
has made an important contribution to achieving 
a higher level of legal certainty, particularly 
against the backdrop of the rather fuzzy and, at 
times, unsettled practice of the CJEU with regard 
to communication to the public through other 
technological means, and the emerging national 
cases. The “new public” criterion appeared critical 
in the court’s assessment. The finding that Svensson 
does not satisfy it permitted hyperlinking as a 
copyright-irrelevant act to operate as it presently 
does. In broader terms, this outcome accommodates 
both the essential functions of the Internet as a 
network of networks in the technical sense, as well as 
its function as a comprehensive cognitive database 
with substantial societal implications. 
37 In the latter sense, the “permission to link” granted 
through Svensson is by no means trivial despite 
the relatively straightforward facts of the case. It 
enables future innovation on the Internet, which 
is not excessively focused on copyright holders. It 
is in this sense evident that, although an important 
goal of resolving copyright issues is to protect right 
holders, courts also need to take into account the 
overall sustainability of the digital environment 
and protect broader public interests. Enhancing 
creativity in this sense may no longer mean 
ensuring absolute authorial control over digital 
content. Rather, creativity may increasingly require 
flexible systems that embrace hybrid collaborative 
modes and the new modes of peer production that 
characterize the networked information economy.75 
The drafters of the WIPO Internet Treaties discussed 
the possibilities that digital technologies might offer, 
but could not have been fully aware of all the deep 
societal effects of the Internet. For that reason, 
and very fortunately, the Treaties leave room for 
purposive interpretation, flexible implementation 
and sensible application.
38 Svensson is an affirmative reaction and an intimation 
as to how this may work. Its importance as a 
precedent has only been augmented by the more 
recently decided case of BestWater.76 Similarly to 
Svensson, the latter stemmed from a request for 
a preliminary ruling, this time from the German 
Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof), and concerned 
the interpretation of Article 3(1) of the Information 
Society Directive. The essential question asked 
was: “Does the embedding, within one’s own 
website, of another person’s work made available 
to the public on a third-party website […] constitute 
communication to the public within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC, even where that 
other person’s work is not thereby communicated 
to a new public and the communication of the work 
does not use a specific technical means which differs 
from that of the original communication?”.77 Or, to 
put it in layman’s terms, the question was whether 
we can embed videos available on other websites, 
such as YouTube, on our own websites. The facts of 
the case were slightly more complicated than those 
behind Svensson, and related to a dispute between a 
water filtering company, BestWater International, 
and two commercial agents working for a competitor. 
They had embedded a short advertising video on 
their website that was produced by BestWater 
but uploaded on YouTube, seemingly without 
BestWater’s consent. BestWater claimed copyright 
infringement and asked for the removal of the video 
as well as for compensation.78 After the video was 
taken down, the questions of the compensation and 
the trial costs remained relevant and the first and 
second instances decided them differently – the 
first court to the benefit of the BestWater, while the 
second to the benefit of the two agents, Mebes and 
Potsch (while distributing the trial costs between 
the parties).79 BestWater took the case to the highest 
court, Bundesgerichtshof, and it referred the key 
“embedding” question to the CJEU. 
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39 The CJEU was rather swift and pragmatic in its 
approach, and this is despite the factual uncertainties 
with regard to whether there was a permission by 
the copyright owner for the distribution of the short 
film and in this sense communication to the public. 
The Court found notably that: “… the embedding 
of a protected work which is publicly available on 
a website in another website by means of a link 
using the framing technology, as was in the main 
proceedings at issue, does not by itself constitute 
communication to the public within the meaning 
of Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29, to the extent 
that the relevant work is neither communicated to 
a new public nor is it communicated using a specific 
technical means, which is different from that of 
the original communication”.80 The CJEU explicitly 
referred to Svensson and the therein used criterion 
of a “new public”.81 It clarified in addition the 
particularity of the framing technology, which while 
allowing access to a work, does not necessarily mean 
that the copyright protected work is made available 
to a new public.82 The court went on to note that, “… 
if and to the extent that this work is freely accessible 
on the website to which the Internet link leads, 
there is an assumption that the copyright holders 
have, when they permitted this communication, 
considered all Internet users as the public”.83
40 In this sense, one could say that Svensson has already 
been tested and its argumentation seems to hold. On 
the other hand, despite the substantially increased 
legal certainty, there are still a number of questions 
open and we should not be fooled into believing that 
the relationship between copyright liability and 
Internet links in EU law has been settled once and 
for all.
41 First, it is noteworthy that it was the “new public” 
condition that really saved the case. This is in 
contrast to more liberal interpretations, which argue 
that with hyperlinking no transmission, regarded as 
a prerequisite for the communication to the public, 
occurs,84 and tend to agree with the German Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Paperboy that a hyperlink is 
a mere reference, comparable to a quotation, in 
particular as the operator of the target website still 
possesses full control over the making available of 
the works. Jane Ginsburg has furthermore agued 
that the so-applied “new public” condition can be 
conceived as a kind of implied license, and that 
this condition should then apply differently if the 
content on the source website is infringing – that 
is, if it should not have been made available to any 
public in the first place. Ginsburg argues that, if the 
content were infringing, there will have been no 
license, implied or otherwise.85 
42 In addition, the “new public” criterion may be 
controversial as it may, in effect, instruct source 
website owners to install a paywall or other type 
of restricted access that would mean that any 
further hyperlinking happens to a “new public”.86 
Also, as Ginsburg suggests, with the wider spread 
of aggregators, which in essence function as 
automated information generators,87 the link 
aggregator may not be providing access to a public 
that would not otherwise have had access, but as 
a practical matter is increasing access for those 
members of the public who may otherwise have 
had difficulty finding the source websites. In this 
sense, she rightly asks whether the viewers of the 
aggregated content should not be considered as a 
“new public”.88 Numerous further questions with 
regard to advertising, remuneration, competition, 
and other types of embedded hyperlinks are as yet 
unanswered, and we are likely to see a more complex 
and nuanced case law emerging post-Svensson, as 
BestWater already proves.89 For now, the permission 
to link remains. 
* Mira Burri, World Trade Institute, University of 
Bern. Contact at mira.burri@wti.org. Elements of 
this article build upon previous work undertaken in 
collaboration with Jeremy de Beer of the University 
of Ottawa, J. de Beer and M. Burri, “Transatlantic 
Copyright Comparisons: Making Available via 
Hyperlinks in the European Union and Canada”, 
European Intellectual Property Review 2 (2014), pp. 
95–105. All mistakes in the present version are my 
own. All websites were last accessed on 15 September 
2014.
1 WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996, WIPO Publication 
No. 226, (1997) 36 ILM 65, entered into force 6 March 2002 
[hereinafter WCT].
2 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 20 December 1996, 
WIPO Publication No. 227, (1997) 36 ILM 76, entered into force 
20 May 2002 [hereinafter WPPT].
3 R. L. Okediji, “The Regulation of Creativity under the WIPO 
Internet Treaties”, Fordham Law Review 77:5 (2009), pp. 
2379–2410.
4 Case C-466/12, Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, 
Pia Gadd v Retriever Sverige AB, Judgment of the Court of 13 
February 2014, OJ (2014) C 93/12 [nyr].
5 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, 9 September 1886, revised at Paris, 24 July 1971 and 
as amended 28 September 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 20 
of the Berne Convention allows its member states to enter 
into copyright agreements if “such agreements grant to 
authors more extensive rights than those granted by the 
Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to [the] 
Convention”. See Article 1(1) WCT; also Okediji, supra note 3, 
at pp. 2387–2392.
6 WCT, Preamble, at para. 2.
7 See e.g. Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production 
Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2006); J. Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing 
the Commons of the Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2008).
8 See e.g. N. W. Netanel, ‘Why Has Copyright Expanded? Analysis 
and Critique’ in F. Macmillan (ed), New Directions in Copyright 
Law: Vol. 6 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007), pp. 3–34; D. 
J. Halbert, The State of Copyright: The Complex Relationships of 
Cultural Creation in a Globalized World (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 
2014). 
Permission to Link
2014 253 3
9 Okediji, supra note 3.
10 WCT, Preamble, at para. 5.
11 Okediji, supra note 3, at p. 2381.
12 Ibid., at p. 2380.
13 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998) [hereinafter 
the DMCA].
14 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, [2001] OJ L 167/10 [hereinafter the Information 
Society Directive].
15 See e.g. U. Gasser, Copyright and Digital Media in a Post-Napster 
World: International Supplement (Cambridge, MA: Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society, 2005); A. Abdel Latif, “From 
Consensus to Controversy: The WIPO Internet Treaties and 
Lessons for Intellectual Property Norm Setting in the Digital 
Age”, in M. Burri and T. Cottier (eds.), Trade Governance in the 
Digital Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
pp. 367–395.
16 See e.g. Okediji, supra note 3; P. K. Yu (ed), Intellectual Property 
and Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age, Vol: 
4, International Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2007); N. Lucchi, Digital Media and 
Intellectual Property: Management of Rights and Consumer 
Protection in a Comparative Analysis (Berlin: Springer, 2006). 
17 L. Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid 
Economy (New York: Penguin Press, 2008); J. Zittrain, The 
Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2008); I. Brown and C. T. Marsden, Regulating 
Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).
18 See e.g. S. Fitzpatrick, “Copyright Imbalance: US and 
Australian Responses to the WIPO Digital Copyright Treaty”, 
European Intellectual Property Review 22:5 (2000), pp. 214–228; 
M. Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet: The 1996 WIPO 
Treaties, Their Interpretation and Implementation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); J. Reinbothe and S. von Lewinski, The 
WIPO Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and The WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Commentary and Legal 
Analysis (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002); J. Ginsburg, 
“The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public”, in D. 
Vaver and L. Bentley (eds), Intellectual Property in the New 
Millennium: Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 234–247; A. Christie 
and E. Dias, “The New Right of Communication in Australia”, 
Sydney Law Review 27 (2005), pp. 237–262; D. Fewer, “Making 
Available: Existential Inquiries”, in M. Geist (ed), In the Public 
Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2005), pp. 267–284; D. Carson, “Making the Making 
Available Right Available”, Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 
33 (2010), pp. 135–164.
19 Ficsor, ibid., at pp. 499–500.
20 J. de Beer and M. Burri, “Transatlantic Copyright Comparisons: 
Making Available via Hyperlinks in the European Union and 
Canada”, European Intellectual Property Review 2 (2014), pp. 95–
105 (emphasis in the original).
21 De Beer and Burri, ibid.
22 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael 
Hoteles SA, CJEU, Case C-306/05, [2006] ECR I-11519 [SGAE].
23 Ibid., at para. 47, also in reference to Recital 27 of the 
Information Society Directive.
24 Ibid., at para. 54. Similar conclusions have been reached in 
other cases: in Organismos Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon 
Theatrikon ki Optikoakoustikon Ergon v Divani Acropolis Hotel and 
Tourism AE, CJEU, Case C-136/09, [2010] ECR I-37 [OSDDTOE], 
the CJEU said that a hotel owner who installs TV sets in 
hotel rooms that are connected to an antenna undertakes 
an act of communication to the public; in Phonographic 
Performance (Ireland) v Ireland, CJEU, Case 162/10, [2012] ECR 
I-0000 [Phonographic Performance (Ireland)], the same applied 
for a hotel operator who provided televisions and radios to 
which it distributed a broadcast signal, or other apparatus 
and phonograms in physical or digital form, which may be 
played on or heard from such apparatus. While the first case 
fell under the Information Society Directive, the second was 
under the Rental and Lending Directive 2006/115/EC. Also, in 
Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure, the Court 
held that the transmission of the broadcast works through a 
TV screen and speakers to the customers in a public house 
is covered by “communication to the public” (Joined cases 
Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure, Case C-403/08, 
and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services, Case C-429/08, 
[2011] ECR I-0000 [Football League and Karen Murphy]).
25 Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso Case, 
C-135/10, [2012] ECR I-0000, at paras 90 et seq [SCF].
26 Graphical user interface (GUI) is a type of user interface that 
allows users to interact with electronic devices using images 
rather than text commands.
27 Bezpecnostní Softwarová Asociace v Ministerstvo Kultury, Case 
C-393/09, [2010] ECR I-13971 [BSA].
28 The Court said that Article 3(1) “is inspired by Article 8 of the 
WCT, the wording of which it reproduces almost verbatim” in 
SCF, supra note 25, at para. 72. The Court therefore considers 
Article 8 WCT as guidance on defining “communication to the 
public”. See SGAE, supra note 22, at para. 35; Peek & Cloppenburg 
KG v Cassina SpA, Case C-456/06, [2008] ECR I-2731, at para 31; 
SCF, supra note 25, at paras 51–55.
29 Joined cases Football League and Karen Murphy, supra note 24, 
at para. 193.
30 Information Society Directive, at Recital 23 (emphasis added).
31 ITV Broadcasting Ltd & 6 Ors v TV Catchup, Case C-607/11,  [2013] 
ECR I-0000, at paras 43 and 46 respectively [TV Catchup].
32 SGAE, supra note 22, at paras 38–39.
33 TV Catchup, supra note 31, at para. 34.
34 SGAE, supra note 22, at para. 40; see also OSDDTOE, supra note 
24, at para. 38.
35 Football Association and Karen Murphy, supra note 24, at para. 
197; referring also to SGAE, supra note 22, at paras 40, 42, and 
OSDDTOE, supra note 24, at para. 38.
36 SGAE, supra note 22, at paras 41–42; Joined cases Airfield and 
Canal Digitaal v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten 
en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam), C-431/09, and Airfield NV v Agicoa 
Belgium BVBA, C-432/09, [2011] ECR I-0000 [Airfield], at para. 79; 
Football Association and Karen Murphy, supra note 24, at paras 
98–99.
37 Airfield, ibid., at para. 79. The case was decided under 
Satellite and Cable Directive (Council Directive 93/83/
EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright 
applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission 
(OJ 1993 L 248/15). It concerned situations where the supplier 
of a digital satellite television service does not transmit its 
own programme but either receives the programme-carrying 
signals from a broadcasting station or instructs a broadcaster 
to transmit programme-carrying signals to a satellite from 
which they are beamed to subscribers to the digital television 
services. The CJEU decided that even indirect transmission 
requires authorization, unless the right holders have agreed 
beforehand with the broadcasting organization that the 
protected works will also be communicated to the public 
through that provider, and when the provider does not make 
those works accessible to a new public.
38 TV Catchup, supra note 31. TV Catchup (TVC) operates an 
online platform that retransmits intercepted terrestrial and 
2014
Mira Burri
254 3
satellite TV channels, enabling subscribers to watch “near-
live” television on their computers, tablets, mobile phones 
and other devices. TVC’s service is funded by advertising 
before the live stream is viewed, as well as by “in-skin 
advertising”. Several UK commercial broadcasters (including 
ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5) brought proceedings before 
the English High Court contending that the streaming of 
their broadcasts is an unauthorised “communication to the 
public”. The High Court took the view that it was not clear 
from previous CJEU case law that there was a “communication 
to the public” under circumstances such as this where works 
are streamed to subscribers who are already entitled to access 
the original broadcast signals via TVs in their own homes, 
and referred this question to the CJEU. The English Court also 
asked whether it made a difference to the CJEU’s response if 
subscribers were only allowed a one-to-one connection to 
the TVC server, and whether the fact that TVC was acting in 
direct competition with the commercial broadcasters, both in 
terms of viewers and advertising revenues, should have any 
effect on the decision.
39 Ibid., at para. 38.
40 Ibid., at para. 39; see also paras 24–26.
41 Streamlining the practice in this regard after a somewhat 
different opinion expressed by Advocate General Kokott in 
the Football Association case, where she found that the FAPL’s 
copyright in the broadcast of live football matches had been 
exhausted. See joined cases Football Association and Karen 
Murphy, supra note 24, for the opinion of AG Kokott at para. 
200.
42 A. Kur and T. Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013), at 
p. 299.
43 European Copyright Society, “Opinion on the Reference to 
the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson” (15 February 2013), also 
published as L. Bently, E. Derclaye, G. Dinwoodie, T. Dreier, S. 
Dusollier, C. Geiger, J. Griffiths, R. Hilty, P. B. Hugenholtz, M-C. 
Janssens, M. Kretschmer, A. Metzger, A. Peukert, M. Ricolfi, 
M. Senftleben, A. Strowel, M. Vivant, R. Xalabarder, “The 
Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson”, Cambridge 
University Legal Studies Research Paper 6 (2013) [hereinafter ECS, 
“Opinion”].
44 See e.g. J. Litman, Digital Copyright (Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books, 2001), at p. 183; T. Aplin, Copyright Law in the Digital 
Society: The Challenges of Multimedia (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), at p. 151; L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property 
Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at p. 151.
45 ECS, “Opinion”, supra note 43, at pp. 10–11, citing Perfect 10 v 
Google, 487 F (3d) 701 (9th Cir 2007).
46 Ibid., at pp. 8–9, citing Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 
SCR 269, at paras 26, 30.  
47 ALAI, Report and Opinion on the Making Available and 
Communication to the Public in the Internet Environment – Focus 
on Linking Techniques on the Internet, adopted unanimously by 
the Executive Committee, 16 September 2013.
48 ALAI, ibid. (emphasis in the original).
49 ALAI, ibid, at p. 9.
50 ALAI, ibid., at p. 10.
51 A. Ohly, “Economic Rights”, in E. Derclaye (ed), Research 
Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), pp. 212–241.
52 See e.g. Brein v Techno Design [2006] ECDR 21 (Netherlands); 
Universal Music v Cooper [2006] FCAFC 187 (Full Federal Court 
of Australia); Napster.no [2005] IIC 120 (Norway). See also Ohly, 
ibid.
53 ECS, “Opinion”, supra note 43, at p. 2.
54 Ibid., at pp. 9–10, excerpting from Paperboy, Case I ZR 259/00 
(17 July 2003), [2005] ECDR (7) 67, 77: “The Information Society 
Directive […] has not changed the assessment of hyperlinks, 
as are in question here, under copyright law ... According to 
Art. 3(1) of the Information Society Directive Member States 
are obliged to provide authors with the exclusive right to 
authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of 
their works, including the making available to the public of 
their works in such a way that members of the public may 
access them from a place and a time individually chosen 
by them. This provision refers to the use of works in their 
communication to the public. The setting of hyperlinks is 
not a communication in this sense; it enables neither the 
(further) keeping available of the work nor the on-demand 
transmission of the work to the user”. 
55 Ibid., at p. 10, citing Tono et al v Frank Allan Bruvik d/b/a Napster, 
(2006) IIC 120 (Supreme Court of Norway, 27 January 2005).
56 Ibid.
57 See also similarly, Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 15 June 2006, 
BREIN v. Techno Design, [2006] ECDR 21.
58 Stephen Vousden, “Case C-466/12, Svensson – Hyperlinks 
and Communicating Works to the Public” (20 January 2013), 
available at http://eulawradar.com/case-c-46612-svensson-
hyperlinks-and-communicating-works-to-the-public/.
59 The defendant’s website had a hyperlink that directed users 
to a website in Australia. The Australian website had a set 
of copyright-protected photographs – a series of nudes of a 
person who appears on Dutch television.
60 Vousden, supra note 58.
61 The actual questions referred to in Svensson, are the following:
1. If anyone other than the holder of copyright in a certain work 
supplies a clickable link to the work on his website, does that 
constitute communication to the public within the meaning of Article 
3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society?
2. Is the assessment under question 1 affected if the work to which 
the link refers is on a website on the Internet which can be accessed 
by anyone without restrictions or if access is restricted in some way?
3. When making the assessment under question 1, should any 
distinction be drawn between a case where the work, after the user 
has clicked on the link, is shown on another website and one where 
the work, after the user has clicked on the link, is shown in such a way 
as to give the impression that it is appearing on the same website?
4. Is it possible for a Member State to give wider protection to authors’ 
exclusive right by enabling ‘communication to the public’ to cover 
a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(1) of Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society?
62 It should be noted that Retriever’s customers needed to log in 
to the website. Upon search, customers were then provided 
with a list of hyperlinks to relevant articles. Clicking on a 
hyperlink opened a new window, which showed the article’s 
text as retrieved from the websites of third parties.
63 Svensson, at para. 42. 
64 Svensson, at paras 16, 24.
65 SGAE, supra note 22, at para. 43.
66 Svensson, at para. 19.
67 Svensson, at para. 20.
68 Svensson, at para. 21.
69 Svensson, at para. 24, by analogy to SGAE, supra note 22, at 
paras 40, 42, and OSDDTOE, supra note 24, at para. 39.
70 Svensson, at para. 26.
71 Svensson, at para. 29.
72 This has been relevant for a later case, Case C-348/13, 
BestWater International Request for a preliminary ruling from 
the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 25 June 2013 – 
Permission to Link
2014 255 3
BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes, Stefan Potsch, OJ 
(2013) C 325/8; see next section below.
73 Svensson, at para. 31.
74 Svensson, at paras 33–41, 42(2).
75 See e.g. Benkler, supra note 7; also J. E. Cohen, “Creativity and 
Culture in Copyright Theory”, UC Davis Law Review 40 (2007), 
pp. 1151–1205; J. E. Cohen, “The Place of the User in Copyright 
Law”, Fordham Law Review 74 (2005), pp. 347–374; Y. Benkler 
and H. Nissenbaum, “Commons-based Peer Production and 
Virtue”, Journal of Political Philosophy 14:4 (2006), pp. 394–419.
76 Case C-348/13, BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes, 
Stefan Potsch, judgment of 21 October 2014, nyr, text available 
only in German and French: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-348/13&td=ALL 
77 Bestwater, supra note 72.
78 Bestwater judgment, supra note 76, at para. 6.
79 Ibid., at paras 7 and 8.
80 Ibid., at para. 19 (author’s own translation). In the original: 
“...dass die Einbettung eines auf einer Website öffentlich 
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